

DDI 301-63  
Executive Registry  
63-996/a

\*FEMA REVIEW COMPLETED\*

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
6/26/03

Mr. Edward A. McDermott  
Director, Office of Emergency Planning  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McDermott:

In response to your letter of 4 February, I should like to designate Major General [ ] USA Retired, as my representative on the interagency committee to develop and maintain assumptions for non-military planning. I feel certain that General [ ], who is a member of the Board of National Estimates will provide the level and type of representation outlined in your letter and in the President's memorandum.

I would prefer, if possible, to postpone designation of our representative to the committee staff. The work to be undertaken is likely to involve coordination of more than one of our components, and further information as to the workings of the committee will aid us in this selection. I am sure, moreover, that the first meeting of the committee will help clarify the extent to which intelligence will be an input to the committee's work.

Faithfully yours,

\*in our limited usage of  
the word, natch!\*

MSC

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

Distribution:

O & 1 - Adse

2 - AD/NE w/ [ ]

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1 - ER w/ no ASIC

O/DD/I: [ ] bk:11 Feb 63

O/DDCI:EdB:lcv: 12 Feb 63 (Rewritten)

Concurred in by Ray S. Cline as originally prepared.

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Executive Registry  
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

FEB 4 1963

Honorable John A. McCone  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

A major obstacle in advancing our nonmilitary preparedness measures has been the lack of accepted planning assumptions covering the spectrum of continuing international tension and possible conflict, including general nuclear war. The President, by his memorandum of January 9, 1963, a copy of which is attached, has approved the establishment of an inter-agency committee to develop and maintain assumptions for this purpose.

In accordance with the President's memorandum, I now ask you to designate someone to represent you on the committee, as well as an appropriate staff member who will serve with the committee's staff.

I believe the importance of the committee's work requires that your representative be at a level which will permit him to speak for you on matters of policy in this area. It is my intention to organize the committee's work so that the demands on the time of its members will be manageable. However, I can foresee the need for considerable staff effort if the committee is to meet its objectives. A representative of the National Security Council staff will participate in the activities of the committee.

Enclosed is a copy of a background paper on this subject which may be helpful. The points for consideration and the methods of procedure will be set by the committee itself. The present paper is intended only to stimulate thought and focus attention on the problem. The committee will undoubtedly simplify the check list of items to be considered.

Your prompt designation of your representatives will be appreciated, as I hope to call the first meeting in about two weeks.

Sincerely,

Edward A. McDermott

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR


Honorable Edward A. McDermott  
Director, Office of Emergency Planning

As we have discussed, I am interested in improving our planning for the management of our resources and implementing the necessary steps in the economic stabilization field during periods of national emergency. Such nonmilitary planning must be based on assumptions which encompass the entire spectrum of possible conflicts, including the possibility of general nuclear war.

Pursuant to Section 301, Executive Order 11051, I approve the establishment of an inter-agency committee under your chairmanship, with appropriate level representation from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, to provide assumptions on which such plans can be based.

The assumptions developed by this committee should be used by various Federal Agencies in developing plans in the non-military preparedness fields. This will permit the departments and agencies concerned to proceed with their respective non-military preparedness assignments on a common and consistent basis.

Please coordinate the work of this committee with the staff of the National Security Council.



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BACKGROUND PAPER

Planning Assumptions for Nonmilitary Preparedness

Problem: To develop planning assumptions for nonmilitary preparedness against all contingencies in the spectrum of conflict with particular attention to the contingency of general nuclear war. Such assumptions will serve as a common planning base for all agencies concerned with nonmilitary preparedness measures.

Background: On January 9, 1963, the President sent the following memorandum to the Director, Office of Emergency Planning:

"As we have discussed, I am interested in improving our planning for the management of our resources and implementing the necessary steps in the economic stabilization field during periods of national emergency. Such non-military planning must be based on assumptions which encompass the entire spectrum of possible conflicts, including the possibility of general nuclear war.

"Pursuant to Section 301, Executive Order 11051, I approve the establishment of an inter-agency committee under your chairmanship, with appropriate level representation from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, to provide assumptions on which such plans can be based.

"The assumptions developed by this committee should be used by various Federal Agencies in developing plans in the non-military preparedness fields. This will permit the departments and agencies concerned to proceed with their respective

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-2-

nonmilitary preparedness assignments on a common and consistent basis.

"Please coordinate the work of this committee with the staff of the National Security Council."

In the field of nonmilitary planning, OCDM, in the Planning Basis

(Annex I to the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization)

issued general guidance for the Agencies engaged in nonmilitary preparedness. By its nature, it had to be unclassified, and fell short of meeting all guidance requirements, particularly in the areas where military needs have an impact on nonmilitary resources. There is clearly a need for the development of more specific guidance, particularly with respect to the contingency of general nuclear war.

Nonmilitary preparedness planning should project into the future as far as feasible if we are to avoid being continually overtaken by events. When the committee has developed assumptions for the period of the immediate future, it will turn to assumptions for a longer-range period, extending three to five years into the future. There will be further provision for regular review and updating.

Obviously, there are many areas of nonmilitary preparedness where effective planning requires the development of assumptions covering the entire spectrum of possible conflict. These areas, in which

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- 3 -

much planning has been done but which need to be pulled together through the adoption of common planning assumptions, include the following:

1. Supply-requirements analyses from which potential deficiencies can be identified, and definitive plans developed to expedite increased production or plans for substitution.
2. Development by Federal Departments and Agencies of emergency operations plans to manage essential resources of the country (e. g., manpower, transportation, production, energy distribution, etc.).
3. Development of programs for continuity of government at Federal, State and local levels, with particular emphasis on the survival of key personnel (relocation centers, lines of succession, etc.).
4. Development of passive defense measures designed to minimize casualties and damage (Civil Defense programs, warning systems, etc.).
5. Development of guidelines to identify the need for selective use of economic controls.
6. A regular program of nuclear attack hazard studies (NAHICUS series).

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-4-

At least since the National Security Act was passed, official guidance for government planners has taken into account the possibility of general nuclear war involving nuclear attack on the United States. No clearer indication of official concern on this point need be cited than the passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Yet it remains true that to date the only military requirements furnished to ODM, OCDM, or OEP for mobilization planning purposes, with the exception of the petroleum field, are based on an assumption of a war without attack damage on the United States. Repeated efforts to obtain requirements for a general nuclear war contingency have been unsuccessful. In substantial part this has been due to the lack of common planning assumptions.

Discussion: The long history of failure to produce the required assumptions despite (a) the obvious requirements, (b) repeated staff efforts of DOD Installations and Logistics, (c) a series of requests from ODM-OCDM-OEP, and (d) Presidential directives suggests that the difficulty is more than simple procrastination. This is supported by the fact that, for other purposes (e. g., strategic stockpiling, NAHICUS-63), the Joint Chiefs of Staff have freely acknowledged the need for such assumptions and have, in the case of NAHICUS-63, furnished assumptions involving nuclear attack damage.

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-5-

Assistant Secretary of Defense Morris has, in a letter of October 4, 1962, stated the case forcefully for the cooperative development of guiding assumptions in the important area of estimating military requirements. An excerpt of that letter follows:

"With respect specifically to post D-Day materiel requirements for a nuclear war the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made the following observations:

- Joint strategic concepts do not attempt to prejudge the length of a general war.
- The momentum of our military operations will depend largely on the success and timing of recovery and reconstitution of forces, the industrial base, and the overall transportation capabilities of the U.S.
- The key factors which will determine how soon significant military operations can be resumed will be:
  - How much of the industrial base remains that can be devoted to military items; and
  - What raw materials remain which may be devoted to military items.

"Obviously, the initial phase of a nuclear war must be fought with weapons and equipment on hand and there would be no military dependence upon the strategic stockpile during this period. Military requirements following a nuclear attack must be dependent upon national policy planning assumptions, including (1) the total manpower that could be allocated to a reconstituted military force, (2) the estimated Gross National Product in the period following a nuclear war, and (3) the maximum portion of such product during a period of reconstruction and rehabilitation which could be allocated to the military effort.

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-6-

"It is our feeling that such assumptions should not be developed unilaterally by any one government department but rather should be the result of a joint study by the major government agencies capable of contributing substantively to this effort. The development of uniform assumptions should include, as a minimum, input from your office, State Department and CIA, as well as the Department of Defense."

In a related communication of September 14, 1962, Assistant Secretary of State Johnson recognizes the same need, as indicated by the following excerpts:

"I recognize that the previous State Department policy guidance to which you refer, the 'Dependability of Foreign Sources of Strategic Materials in Wartime,' may no longer be appropriate for your purposes. As a continuing exercise, it would inevitably require revision in light of current developments. More fundamentally, however, this document was focussed primarily on the factors at the time considered by stockpiling authorities to be especially relevant to the determination of stockpiling objectives. Under different assumptions regarding emergency planning, some alternative framework for assessing the political risks involved in continued access to strategic materials presumably would be necessary.

"For this purpose, we would have to be clear as to the assumptions underlying your requirements. Are we, for example, assuming a nuclear war situation, a general but non-nuclear war of varying duration, or the continuation of the Cold War under varying degrees of tension? Furthermore, are we dealing with U. S. requirements alone or considering the question of requirements for the Free World as a whole? I can appreciate that these and other related considerations would affect your approach to emergency planning, notably, as you point out, in the emphasis placed on stockpiling as compared with encouraging pilot research projects to develop substitute materials. . . . .

"We are prepared to cooperate and participate fully in any re-examination of these basic questions."

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